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Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal
Concept Strategy Grounded
GUY DOVE AND ANDREAS ELPIDOROU

Abstract: The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) offers the physicalist perhaps
the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts
and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this essay, we
show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often
embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of
the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of
the PCS that is thoroughly in keeping with embodied cognition, focuses on features
of physical concepts, and succeeds in explaining the appearance of contingency.

1. Introduction

Physicalism requires that mental facts are metaphysically necessitated by physical facts. Yet
the connection between the two appears to be contingent. It is thus incumbent upon
proponents of physicalism to offer some explanation of this apparent contingency. The
Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) offers what is perhaps the most influential and widely
used means of addressing this challenge.1 According to the PCS, the appearance of

The label ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ comes from Stoljar (2005). Proponents of the
phenomenal concept strategy are physicalists who respond to epistemic arguments against physicalism by
maintaining (i) that the existence of epistemic gaps between phenomenal truths and physical truths is
consistent with the truth of physicalism – they are thus proponents of what Chalmers (1999) calls ‘Type-B
Materialism’ – and (ii) that such epistemic gaps admit of a purely physical explanation insofar as they the
products of certain features of our phenomenal concepts. Authors who defend physicalism from
epistemic arguments by citing the nature of phenomenal concepts include: Loar, 1990, 1997, and 2003;
Hill, 1997; Hill and McLaughlin, 1999; Tye, 1995, 1999, 2000, and 2003; Perry, 2001; Papineau, 2002 and
2007; Levin, 2007a; Balog, 2012; Diaz-Leon, 2008 and 2014; Elpidorou, 2013 and 2015b.
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contingency arises because thinking about the connection between mental facts and physical
facts involves the exercise of both physical and phenomenal concepts. But the exercise of
those two kinds of concepts brings about a difference in introspective phenomenology: only
the exercise of phenomenal concepts is thought to involve a distinctive phenomenologicallyrich experience. It is precisely this difference in phenomenology – not the lack of a
necessitation relation between the referents of the two types of concepts – that is assumed to
give rise to the appearance of contingency.
Supporters of the PCS generally rely on intuitive psychological claims and
distinctions to make their case. Our aim in this essay is to evaluate the PCS in light of recent
empirical research on concepts. If it is true that mind-brain identity statements appear to be
contingent, then psychology and cognitive science should help us to understand the nature
of this appearance. When we look to cognitive science, though, a problem arises. A robust
and growing body of evidence suggests that our concepts are often grounded in
sensorimotor systems. On its face, this speaks against the explanation of the appearance of
contingency offered by standard forms of the PCS (Shea, 2014). Specifically, it appears to be
a mistake to insist that only the exercise of phenomenal concepts brings about a rich
introspective phenomenology.
Even though it appears that standard versions of the PCS fail to hit their mark, we
argue that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly in keeping
with embodied cognition. The problem with standard versions is their assumption that the
relevant distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts can be captured purely in
terms of the presence (or absence) of phenomenal properties. We suggest that the
employment of physical concepts involves a multimodal complexity that the employment of
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phenomenal concepts lacks. The appearance of contingency in mind-brain identity
statements can then be seen as a consequence of this phenomenological difference.
Ultimately, it is the relative lack of a certain kind of phenomenological flexibility associated
with the employment of phenomenal concepts that leads us to think that the referents of
phenomenal concepts cannot be physical objects and events.

2. From Psychology to Metaphysics

In the concluding pages of Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke famously advances an argument
against mind-brain identity theories. Let us agree that ‘pain of type Φ’ (hereafter abbreviated
as ‘pain Φ’) and ‘neural activity Ψ’2 are both rigid designators and that pain Φ, according to
identity theorists, is identical to neural activity Ψ. The statement ‘pain Φ is neural activity Ψ,’
if true, must be true necessarily. Yet the statement appears to be contingent: we can conceive
of a possible world3 in which pain Φ occurs but there is no neural activity Ψ, and we can
conceive of a possible world in which there is neural activity Ψ without the occurrence of
pain Φ. This appearance of contingency is at odds with the purported metaphysical status of
Many philosophers use the identity statement ‘pain is c-fiber firing’ as shorthand for the more
general claim that pain is identical to some brain state or process. We avoid this locution because it is
misleading. Not only is c-fiber firing neither necessary nor sufficient for pain experience, but this
formulation suggests without argument that both pain (which is associated with different phenomenal
properties such as stabbing, dull, etc. and comes in different varieties such as acute, chronic, neuropathic,
psychogenic, etc.) and the relevant brain states or processes (which involve multiple cortical and
subcortical systems) are inherently simple and one-dimensional. Our formulation is compatible with the
likely complexity of both sides of the identity.
3
Our use of possible-worlds discourse leaves undecided many contentious philosophical issues
including the semantic and logical structure of possible-worlds sentences and the ontological
commitments of such a discourse. Such neutrality is intentional. Not only are our findings independent of
how one interprets possible-worlds discourse but we also wish to reap the benefits of such discourse
without incurring, at least at this point, any ontological costs. Our use of possible-worlds is thus similar to
everyday use of mathematical, moral, or color discourse: more often than not, one employs such a
discourse both effectively and profitably, without having to accept either a particular interpretation of
such discourse or its ontological commitments.
2
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the proposition expressed by the identity statement. If ‘pain Φ is neural activity Ψ’ is true
necessarily, then there can be no possible world in which pain Φ is not neural activity Ψ and
in which neural activity Ψ is not pain Φ. Identity theorists thus owe us a story as to how an
identity claim can appear to be contingent even though it is not. As Kripke puts it:

Someone who wishes to maintain an identity thesis [say, ‘A is identical to B,’ where
‘A’ names the sensation of pain and ‘B’ names a brain state] cannot simply accept the
Cartesian intuitions that A can exist without B, that B can exist without A, that the
correlative presence of anything with mental properties is merely contingent to B,
and that the correlative presence of any specific physical properties is merely
contingent to A. He must explain these intuitions away, showing how they are
illusory (Kripke, 1980, p.148).4

The problem with the mind-brain identity thesis is that there seems to be no obvious way of
explaining away the appearance of contingency (see also Kripke, 1971). Unlike other a
posteriori necessary identity statements (e.g., ‘water is H2O’ or ‘heat is molecular motion’), the
appearance of contingency in mind-brain identity statements is persistent.5

In the quoted passage, Kripke uses ‘A’ as the name for a specific sensation of pain, and not, as we
do, as a name for a type of sensation.
5
Although Kripke’s argument was intended as an argument against identity theory, it can be easily
turned into an argument against supervenience or metaphysical necessitation physicalism. Suppose that ‘P’
stands for the conjunction of all physical facts and laws about the world expressed in the fundamental
vocabulary of a true and complete physical theory; ‘T’ stands for a ‘that’s all’ claim stating that what is
expressed in P is the complete description of our world; ‘I’ stands for basic indexical information of the
sort, ‘I am here’ and ‘It is now;’ and ‘Q’ stands for any true claim about phenomenal states. If either
supervenience or metaphysical necessitation physicalism is true, then the conditional PIT ⊃ Q must be
necessarily true. But the conditional appears to be contingent: one can imagine a possible world in which
PIT holds, but in which Q (say, ‘I am now in pain’) does not. If the conditional appears to be contingent,
then proponents of supervenience or metaphysical necessitation physicalism, just like those of identity
theory, need to respond to Kripke’s argument.
4
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In recent years, many physicalists have offered a response to Kripke’s challenge and
something like a consensus has begun to surface. According to them, mind-brain identity
statements should not be thought to be analogous to ordinary a posteriori identity statements
of the sort ‘heat is molecular motion,’ for even though we can explain away the appearance
of contingency in the latter case, the appearance of contingency in the former remains. Yet,
this persistence of the appearance of contingency raises no insurmountable difficulties for
physicalism. That is because proponents of physicalism can offer a physicalistically
acceptable explanation of both the appearance of contingency and its persistency. Kripke’s
challenge is thus met not by explaining away the appearance of contingency, but by
explaining why the appearance fails to go away.
In trying to account for the appearance and persistency of contingency, the following
approach, which is integral to most versions of the PCS, has gained prominence. First, a
distinction between two different ways of thinking about conscious experiences is drawn.
Accordingly, one can think of experiences both physically and phenomenally. One thinks of
experiences (one’s own or others’) physically if one thinks about them in terms of either
their material constitution or their functional/behavioral profiles. In doing so, one picks out
experiences as external, physical (or functional) properties, and does so via the use of what
are often called ‘physical concepts.’ 6 At the same time, one can also think of experiences in
terms of their phenomenological character. In this case, one thinks of experiences from

For our purposes, what is crucial to note about physical concepts is that they permit us to
conceptualize physical categories in a manner that is not restricted to one particular sensorimotor
modality. The fact that physical concepts are such that they permit us to apprehend their referents from a
multiplicity of modally distinct points of view underlies (at least partly) the claim that the referents of
physical concepts are external or third-personal entities or properties. In other words, physical concepts,
in light of the fact that they multimodal (in the sense specified above), are prime candidates of concepts
that ought to figure in descriptions of how things objectively are (see Nagel, 1974, pp. 442f.) A more
detailed explication of physical concepts is given in Section 5 and in our response to Objection 2 in
Section 6.
6
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within, so to speak, and in doing so one employs phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal
concepts are the concepts that we use when, but arguably not only when, we introspectively
notice or focus on the phenomenological character of our experiences. They refer to
phenomenological properties (or qualities) and they do so in a first-personal and direct (nonrelational) manner. Different proposals specifying the nature of these concepts can be found
in the literature.7 However, as long as such accounts are enlisted in the service of
physicalism, they must all hold that the referents of phenomenal concepts are ultimately
physical. In other words, although phenomenal concepts may conceive of or present their
referents phenomenally, they must still denote physical states or properties.
It is precisely on the basis of the distinction between physical and phenomenal
concepts that many proponents of the PCS have found a way to respond to Kripke’s
challenge. More specifically, they have offered the following explanation for the appearance
of contingency in mind-brain identity statements:

Difference in Introspective Phenomenology (DIP): Mind-brain identity
statements involve both physical and phenomenal concepts. Entertaining such
statements, therefore, requires the exercise of both physical and phenomenal
concepts. But the exercise of those two different kinds of concepts brings about a
Some hold that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that pick out their referents
directly and that are individuated in terms of the possession of certain recognitional capacities (Loar, 1997;
Tye, 2000; Carruthers, 2003). Others claim that phenomenal concepts are such that either they are partly
constituted by the very phenomenological experience to which they refer, or their use involves versions of
their referents (Papineau, 2002 and 2007; Chalmers, 2003; Block, 2006; Balog, 2012). Others argue that
phenomenal concepts are indexical or demonstrative concepts and hold that their use involves something
akin to an introspective ‘pointing’ (‘this [kind of experience]’) (Tye, 1995; Ismael, 1999; Perry, 2001; Levin,
2007a; Stalnaker, 2008; Schroer, 2010). Additional characterizations of the nature of phenomenal
concepts, can be found in Sturgeon, 1994; Hill and McLaughlin, 1997; Hawthorne, 2002; BraddonMitchell, 2003; and Aydede and Güzeldere, 2005. For an account of the involvement of phenomenal
concepts in introspective knowledge, see Gertler, 2001. And for an overview of phenomenal concepts, see
Elpidorou, 2015b.
7
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difference in introspective phenomenology. The exercise of phenomenal concepts
typically involves a distinctive experience, viz., one that is similar or identical to the
referent of the phenomenal concept deployed, whereas the exercise of physical
concepts does not. It is precisely this difference in phenomenology that gives rise to
the appearance of contingency. Example: Thinking about patterns of neural activity
Ψ does not involve the same type of phenomenology that thinking about pain Φ
involves. On account of this difference in phenomenology, we are misled to think
that the concepts PAIN Φ and NEURAL ACTIVITY Ψ do not necessarily co-refer.

DIP can be traced back to Nagel’s (1974, fn. 11) famous distinction between sympathetic and
perceptual imagination. Note, however, that whereas Nagel’s distinction is meant to explain
the appearance of contingency in imaginative acts, DIP applies to ways of thinking about
mind-brain identity statements that occur without the explicit engagement of imagination.
Furthermore, Nagel’s proposed model for explaining the appearance of contingency is often
thought to require a distinction between two psychological mechanisms or faculties of the
imagination (Doggert & Stoljar 2010, pp. 128-130). DIP requires no such distinction. Still,
both DIP and Nagel’s explanation of the appearance of contingency are premised on the
existence of a difference in introspective phenomenology between thinking of or imagining
mental states, on the one hand, and thinking of or imagining brain states, on the other.
Although a version of DIP can also be found in Lycan (1987, pp. 76-77), it is Loar
(1990 and 1997) and Papineau (1993) that appear to be the first proponents of physicalism
to have defended DIP in the form given above. For example, in his ‘Phenomenal States,’
Loar writes:

7

A phenomenal concept exercised in the absence of the phenomenal quality it stands
for often involves not merely a recognitional disposition but also an image. And so,
as a psychological state in its own right, a phenomenal concept – given its intimate
connection with imaging – bears a phenomenological affinity to a phenomenal state
that neither state bears to the entertaining of a physical-theoretical concept. When
we then bring phenomenal and physical-theoretical concepts together in our
philosophical ruminations, those cognitive states are phenomenologically so different
that the illusion may be created that their references must be different. It is as though
antiphysicalist intuitions rest on a resemblance theory of mental representation, as
though we conclude from the lack of resemblance in our phenomenal and physicalfunctional conceptions a lack of sameness in the properties to which they refer
(1997, p. 302).8

Papineau’s discussion of the ‘antipathetic fallacy’ reiterates Loar’s diagnosis of the
appearance of contingency (Papineau, 1993). In his Thinking about Consciousness, Papineau
develops DIP even further:

[E]xercising a phenomenal concept will feel like having the experience itself. When
you think imaginatively about a pain, or about seeing something red -- or even more,
when you think introspectively about these experiences while having them – versions
of these experiences themselves will be present in you…Now compare the exercise
A very similar passage can be found in the 1990 version of Loar’s essay, see p. 90. The main
difference between the two passages is that in the 1990 version Loar states that the respective deployment
of the two types of concepts brings about two different psychological states without specifying that the
main difference between them is one of phenomenology. Even so, the ensuing statement makes it clear
that even in 1990 Loar had in mind a model that accounts for the appearance of contingency that is pretty
close (if not identical) to DIP.
8
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of some material concept which might refer to just the same conscious state. No
similar feelings there… So there is an intuitive sense in which exercises of material
concepts ‘leave out’ the experience at issue. They ‘leave out’ the pain and the
technicolour phenomenology, in the sense that they don’t activate or involve these
experiences. Now, it is all too easy to slide from this to the conclusion that, in
exercising material concepts, we are not thinking about the experiences themselves
(2002, p.170).

There is a sense in which material concepts do ‘leave out’ the feelings. They do not
use the experiences in question—they do not activate them, by contrast with
phenomenal concepts, which do activate the experiences… This then offers a natural
account of the intuitive feeling that conscious experiences must be distinct from any
material states. This feeling arises because we have a special way of thinking about
our conscious experiences – namely, by using phenomenal concepts. We can think
about our conscious experiences using concepts to which they bear a phenomenal
resemblance. And this then creates the fallacious impression that other, material ways
of thinking about those experiences fail to refer to the felt experiences themselves (p.
171; compare this to Papineau, 1993 but also to Papineau, 2007, §4).9

In the quotes from Loar and Papineau one could perhaps discern two distinct explanations of the
appearance of contingency. One is simply DIP; the other is DIP plus the claim that only the employment
of phenomenal concepts bears a certain resemblance to their referents. In what follows, we do not
address the second, extended version of DIP for two reasons. First, we are skeptical that the appearance
of contingency can be accounted in terms of resemblance. Second, we do not think that an appeal to
resemblance is necessary. We shall demonstrate how a revised account of DIP can explain the persistency
of the intuition that phenomenal concepts and physical concepts do not co-refer.
9
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In addition to Nagel (1974), Lycan (1987), Loar (1990) and (1997), and Papineau (1993) and
(2002), other proponents of physicalism have thought that introspective phenomenology is
crucial in offering a response to Kripke’s challenge (see, e.g., Tye, 1999, p. 712f. and 2003,
p.100; §17; Balog, 2012, pp. 29-30; cf. Hill, 1997; Sturgeon, 1994, pp. 231-232; Levin
2007b).10 Whether DIP (or something like it) is successful in explaining the appearance of
contingency matters a great deal. Suppose that DIP is indeed accurate, then not only do
proponents of physicalism have an explanation of the appearance of contingency in mindbrain identity statements, but also the offered explanation is one that is congenial to
physicalism.11 On the contrary, if DIP turns out to be incapable of explaining the appearance

One might wonder whether the demonstrative account of phenomenal concepts is also
compatible with DIP. The answer to that question depends on how one characterizes demonstrative
phenomenal concepts. It is customary to draw a distinction between two different characterizations of
demonstrative phenomenal concepts: thin vs. thick (see, e.g., Levine, 2001, p. 82ff.; Levin, 2007a; Schroer,
2010; cf. Chalmers, 2007, p.178; Levine, 2007). According to the thin characterization, phenomenal
concepts do not furnish us with a substantial grasp of their referents. As Levine puts it: such concepts ‘are
pointers we aim at our internal states with very little substantive conception of what sort of thing we're
pointing at—demonstrative arrows shot blindly that refer to whatever they hit’ (Levine, 2001, p. 84). On
the contrary, a thick characterization of phenomenal concepts holds that the use of phenomenal concepts
does provide us with a fairly good grasp of what it is like to have certain experiences. Such a grasp is
intimately tied to an introspective phenomenology: we are able to form a substantive conception of those
experiences because those experiences are introspectively presented to us. Consequently, a thick
characterization is compatible with DIP and proponents of this account can make use of DIP in an
attempt to explain the appearance of contingency. However, a thin characterization does not appear to be
compatible with DIP. If demonstrative phenomenal concepts are taken to be empty pointers, then the
introspective phenomenology required by DIP would be absent. In this essay, we will not be concerned
with a thin demonstrative account of phenomenal concepts. Such an account has been met – rightly so,
we believe – with resistance. Indeed, it has been argued that such an account cannot be a characterization
of phenomenal concepts for it fails to account for the distinctive nature of phenomenal concepts. See,
e.g., Levine, 2007a; Chalmers, 2003, and 2007; Levin 2007, p. 91. We are grateful to an anonymous referee
for pressing us to address the relationship between DIP and the demonstrative account of phenomenal
concepts.
11
Citing a difference in introspective phenomenology is only the first step in providing a response
to epistemic arguments against physicalism (Chalmers, 1996; Jackson, 1984 and 1986). Typically,
proponents of physicalism who appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts also hold that phenomenal
concepts are conceptually isolated from physical or functional concepts. For example, the concepts PAIN
Φ and NEURAL ACTIVITY Ψ are conceptually isolated insofar as one cannot deduce on the basis of a priori
reasoning alone that the two concepts co-refer. It is on account of this conceptual isolation claim that
proponents of physicalism can maintain that an epistemic gap between phenomenal truths and physical
truths is not indicative of a corresponding ontological gap. Not only can a physical property be subsumed
under more than one concept, but also, and more importantly, the fact that we cannot determine a priori
that such concepts pick out the same entity does not entail that they do not.
10
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of contingency, then one of the most widely accepted ways of responding to Kripke’s
challenge has to be given up. Even if this result does not imply the falsity of physicalism, it is
certainly a strike against physicalism.
Our objective in this essay is to evaluate DIP in light of recent empirical research on
concepts. If it is true that mind-brain identity statements appear to be contingent, the
appearance of contingency is first and foremost a psychological fact: it is a fact about how the
human mind operates when it entertains certain statements. But if it is a psychological fact,
then psychology and cognitive science are poised to help us to understand the nature of this
appearance of contingency and to evaluate whether DIP offers the correct explanation.
Given the importance of DIP, it is surprising that proponents of physicalism have generally
advanced it on intuitive grounds and largely without consulting empirical findings regarding
the nature of conceptual representations.
We are not alone in recognizing this omission. Shea (2014) offers an attack on DIP
that rests on the claim that empirical psychology fails to support the very idea of a
meaningful phenomenological distinction between physical concepts and phenomenal
concepts. In particular, he makes an appeal to the large body of evidence suggesting that our
concepts are often embodied and thus grounded in sensorimotor systems. Roughly put, he
argues that conceptual embodiment excludes DIP because physical concepts also contain
experiential representations and their deployment can bring about a certain type of
introspective phenomenology. Intrigued by this argument and somewhat surprised by its
conclusion, we endeavored to examine the relationship of embodied cognition to DIP. What
we found was ultimately more complicated and, to our minds, more interesting than we
initially expected. While it is true that embodiment threatens most traditional formulations of
DIP that focus on the special features of phenomenal concepts, it is possible to formulate a
11

new version of DIP that is thoroughly in keeping with embodied cognition and focuses on
the features of physical concepts. In sum, a close consideration of the empirical evidence
leads to a novel and heretofore unrecognized version of the PCS.
The paper will proceed as follows: In section 3, we review a number of findings that
implicate the involvement of perceptual and motor representations in cognitive tasks. In
section 4, we show how such findings, at least on their face, would seem to undermine DIP.
The lessons that one can draw from embodied cognition, however, are not entirely negative.
Instead, embodiment suggests a way of revising DIP. We present this revised account of
DIP in section 5 and defend it from objections in section 6.

3. Embodiment and Conceptual Grounding

Concepts are important building blocks of human cognition. Cognitive scientists view them
as bodies of knowledge that are stored in long-term memory and used in higher cognitive
activities such as categorization, decision making, and language processing.12 Traditionally,
researchers have assumed that concepts were handled by an amodal representational system
that was independent of the modality-specific systems associated with our experiences of the
world (Anderson, 1983). Recently, though, this assumption has been challenged and there
has been a general movement away from a disembodied view of concepts towards an
embodied one in which they are significantly grounded in sensory and motor systems.

Machery (2009) points out that, although philosophers and psychologists generally assume that
they are talking about the same thing when they use ‘concepts,’ it may very well be the case that they are
talking past each other. There is good reason to think that they asking different questions and seeking to
explain different phenomena. We are not going to take a stand on this issue. Our contention is merely that
some of the empirical research on this subject excludes standard versions of DIP but also supports a new
embodied and grounded version.
12
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A diverse and ever increasing body of evidence supports the thesis that action,
emotion, and perception systems play an instrumental role in many types of conceptual
processing (for extensive reviews see Barsalou, 2008; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Kemmerer,
2010). Because a full accounting of this evidence would take too long, we will limit ourselves
to a brief description of some representative behavioral, brain imaging, and
neuropsychological studies that provide an initial indication that our concepts are tightly
intertwined with sensorimotor systems. For the sake of space and ease of presentation, we
will focus on perceptual and action systems.
A number of behavioral studies implicate perceptual systems in semantic tasks. To
give an example, Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Barsalou (2003) found a modality-switching cost
associated with a property verification task. Participants verified verbally expressed facts
involving one modality (such as the fact that leaves rustle) more rapidly after verifying a fact
involving the same modality (such as the fact that blenders make noise) than after verifying a
fact involving a different modality (such as the fact that cranberries are tart). More recently, van
Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou (2008) found a similar modality-switching cost
when participants alternated between a perceptual detection task and a property verification
task.
Neuroimaging data provide further evidence of perceptual grounding. Martin, Wiggs,
Ungerleider, and Haxby (1996), for example, compared neural responses in a naming task to
line drawings of animals and tools. In addition to shared areas of activation, the animal
drawings selectively activated early visual areas and the tools selectively activated premotor
areas. Some caution is warranted because subsequent studies have generated inconsistent
results with these categories (Gerlach, 2007). Fortunately a number of studies have found
links between conceptual processing and activation in sensory areas. For instance, reading
13

odor-related words (e.g. cinnamon, garlic, and jasmine) elicits increased activation in the primary
olfactory cortex relative to neutral control words (Gonzalez et al., 2006). In a carefully
constructed study combining functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and recordings
of event-related potentials (ERP), visual words with acoustic conceptual features activated
auditory brain areas approximately 150ms after stimulus presentation (Keifer, Sim,
Herrnberger, Grothe, & Hoenig, 2008). The rapidity and selectivity of this response suggests
that is automatic and unconscious. Further support for conceptual grounding in perception
systems is provided by clinical studies indicating that damage to perceptual areas can lead to
conceptual deficits (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). Damage to the somatosensory cortex, for
example, may impair the visual recognition of facial expressions (Adolphs, Damasio, Traniel,
Cooper, & Damasio, 2000) and damage to the left auditory association cortex may impair the
perceptual and conceptual processing of sounds linked to everyday objects (Trumpp, Kleise,
Haarmeier, & Kiefer, 2013).
Behavioral studies also implicate action systems in cognitive tasks. Glenberg and
Kaschak (2002) uncovered an ‘Action-Sentence Compatibility Effect.’ Reaction times in a
sensibility task decreased when response direction (a button pressed either away/toward the
body) and the implied direction of action sentences (e.g. Andy gave you the pizza/You gave Andy
the pizza) were congruent. Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004) found a similar effect when
participants were instructed to decide whether or not a word that followed a sentence named
a part of the object mentioned in the sentence. Half of the selected parts occurred in the
upper-portion of the object and half occurred in the lower-portion of the objects. Responses
were faster when the direction of the key press movement (upward or downward) matched
the part location.

14

One of the more striking examples of research implicating the motor system in
semantic processing involves effector-specific activations in motor areas during language
tasks (Kemmerer, 2010; Willems & Casasanto, 2011). Scorolli and Borghi (2007), for
instance, found such an effect when they asked their participants to judge the sensibility of
simple sentences containing a verb that referred to an action typically performed with the
mouth, hands, or the feet. Subjects responded by pressing a pedal or speaking into a
microphone. Response times with the microphone were fastest with ‘mouth-sentences,’ and
response times with the pedal were fastest with ‘foot-sentences.’ This somatopic specificity
fits with the findings of a number of brain imaging studies. Hauk, Jonstrude, and
Pulvermüller (2004) had participants read similar action words and each type produced
increased activation in the cortical regions associated with performing the relevant
movements. Increased activation in effector-specific premotor and motor areas have been
observed when participants heard action-related sentences (Tettamanti et al., 2005). Rightand left-handers have exhibited increased activation in the premotor areas that were
contralateral to their dominant hands (Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010). Buccino et al.
(2005) demonstrated that listening to action-related sentences affected activity in the motor
system. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) recorded from hand and foot muscles were
selectively modulated by hand-related and foot-related action sentences respectively.
Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, and Ilmonlemi (2005) carried out a repeated Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation study in which they weakly stimulated different parts of the motor
system while participants performed a lexical decision task on arm- and leg-related action
words. Response times increased with arm-related words when there was weak stimulation
of left hemisphere areas associated with arm-movement and with leg-related words when
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there was weak stimulation of motor areas associated with leg-movement. Response times
were not modulated in a control condition with a faux stimulation.
Admittedly, there have been some criticisms of embodied cognition. These fall into
three broad types. The first questions the relative scope of the role played by sensorimotor
systems in our concepts. Some have pointed out that most of the evidence for embodiment
involves concrete concepts (Chatterjee, 2010; Dove, 2009; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008;
Weiskopf, 2007) and suggest that it is reasonable to doubt the inference that all concepts are
equally embodied. The second proposes that the engagement of the sensorimotor systems is
epiphenomenal, perhaps the result of something like spreading activation (Mahon &
Caramazza, 2008; Weiskopf, 2007). The third questions the methodological assumptions
behind this research. For example, it is often pointed out that many of the studies merely
indicate a correlation between sensorimotor activation and conceptual processing and thus
fail to exclude alternative explanations for this activation (Machery, 2007; Mahon, 2015).
Clearly, these issues are substantial and resolving them is beyond the purview of this
essay. We offer some initial responses to each, though, in order to establish the plausibility
of our approach and show that it does not require adopting an overly radical form of the
embodiment thesis. We contend that, despite the existence of controversies surrounding
how to properly characterize embodiment (Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, Vigliocco, 2012;
Shapiro, 2011), the claim that concepts are grounded to some significant extent is well
supported. With respect to the question of scope, we suggest that a reasonable interpretation
of the extant evidence is that it supports the proposition that many concepts (particularly
concrete ones) are dependent on experiential systems13 (Dove, 2011; Louwerse & Connell,

Following a convention of the embodied cognition literature, we are going to use the term
experiential systems as shorthand for the action, emotion, and perceptual systems associated with our
13
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2011; Markman & Brendl, 2005). With respect to the question of causal relevance, we
suggest that the rapidity and apparently automatic nature of the observed effects throws into
doubt the claim that they are epiphenomenal (Keifer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, & Hoenig,
2008; although for a contrary view see Mahon, 2015). It is also worth noting that some of
the evidence outlined above, such as that provided by neuropsychological case studies and
TMS interventions, more directly implicates a causal role for sensorimotor systems. Finally,
with respect to the question of methodology, we suggest that an embodied approach is
supported by a defeasible inference to the best explanation. As should be the case with any
empirical theory, time will tell.
In the end, the notion that some concepts – importantly, some non-phenomenal
concepts – are grounded is supported by a robust body of evidence (for reviews of this
evidence see Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Kemmerer, 2010; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012;
Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, Vigliocco, 2012). Although the theoretical implications of
conceptual grounding are not fully settled, there is good reason to think that experiential
representations employed during our interactions with the world are often re-activated
during many cognitive tasks (Barsalou, 2008; Gallese, 2005; Hesslow, 2012). This reactivation appears to be fast and automatic. Different theories may provide different
accounts of the functional role of this engagement of perceptual, motor, and emotion
systems – for example, viewing it in terms of simulations (Barsalou 1999), action schemas
(Glenberg, 1997), or the dynamic application of sensorimotor skills (van Elk, Slors, &
Bekkering, 2011) – but there is a widespread recognition that such engagement is central to
our concepts.
experience of the world. Experiential representations and experiential processes are elements of these systems.
Some of these will have associated phenomenal properties but some will not. Roughly put, we are leaving
room for unconscious aspects of experience.
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Few would deny that we often have related phenomenal experiences when
employing physical concepts. Thinking about physical objects and events will often elicit
mental imagery associated with those objects and events. Standard forms of the PCS
generally presume that this phenomenal experience is in some significant sense external to
the employment of the concept. An embodied perspective in which our concepts are
grounded in sensorimotor systems throws this presumption into question. After all,
phenomenal experience is a fundamental feature of perception and action. The relevant
multimodal imagery is therefore part of – not separate from – the exercise of the concepts.
An embodied account thus connects the phenomenology associated with physical concepts
to our ability to think with them.

4. An Elusive Distinction?

The upshot of the last section is that our physical concepts are likely to be at least partially
grounded in experiential systems. This creates a problem for supporters of DIP: If the
exercise of physical concepts generally involves these systems, then there may be no clear
distinction between them and phenomenal concepts. In other words, the purported
specialness of phenomenal concepts appears to vanish into thin air.
Recognizing this problem, Shea (2014) develops an argument against proponents of
the PCS who employ the purported difference between the exercise of phenomenal and
physical concepts in accounting for the appearance of contingency in mind-brain identity
statements. Objecting to DIP, Shea contends:
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This tactic fails because the phenomenological difference between exercise of
phenomenal and physical-functional concepts relied on to date is empirically
unsustainable; and there are reasons to doubt that there is any relevant difference in
the phenomenology of the exercise of the two types of concepts that could do the
required explanatory work. My objection has two strands. First, exercise of physicalfunctional concepts can carry perception-like phenomenological properties. Second,
exercise of phenomenal concepts need not (p. 559).

He then goes on to conclude:

Caught between these two strands, it is hard to see that there could be a general
phenomenological difference between the exercise of phenomenal and physicalfunctional concepts (p. 560).

The thrust of the argument is clear, without a general phenomenological difference, one
cannot explain the illusion of contingency in terms of phenomenological properties.
Given the potential importance of this argument, it should be examined carefully.
According to Shea, research suggests that the employment of physical concepts may contain
phenomenological properties (insofar as such an employment would give rise to a
phenomenologically-rich introspective state) and that the employment of so-called
phenomenal concepts may not. We take the first claim to be a reasonable extension of an
embodied and grounded approach to concepts. For it to be false, the experiential
representations responsible for the processing of physical concepts would have to never be
conscious. This strikes us as unlikely and unsupported by the relevant empirical findings.
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The second claim requires more discussion. The empirical evidence supports the notion that
experiential systems are automatically engaged in conceptual tasks. Supporters of
embodiment point to this automaticity as evidence that these representations are functionally
relevant to conceptual processing and not epiphenomenal. Where is the empirical support
for the claim that phenomenological properties are not required? That is, what is the
evidence that supports the claim that the exercise of phenomenal concepts does not have to
render conscious some of the experiential representations involved in these concepts? Shea
does not cite any but, instead, seems to think that such a claim is uncontroversial. He holds
that by entertaining thoughts such as ‘I am not currently having a red sensation’ one deploys
the phenomenal concept

RED SENSATION

14

without at the same time instantiating the

property to which the concept refers.15 One might object to Shea’s claim by insisting that no
deployment of a phenomenal concept is such that it can occur without conscious access to
the relevant experience. We are skeptical of the success of such a response, however,
because it renders phenomenal concepts too special. Given that most researchers hold that
concepts can be unconsciously exercised, the possible absence of perception-like
phenomenological properties with phenomenal concepts follows almost by definition.
Certainly, a fair amount of work would need to be done to justify the claim that a particular

Phenomenal concepts are about conscious states. Given that realism and externalism are active
topics in the philosophy of color (for a thorough discussion of the theoretical terrain see Cohen 2009), it
would be presumptuous to claim that RED is a phenomenal concept. For that reason, we will discuss the
phenomenal concept, RED SENSATION.
15
The thought, and ultimately objection to the PCS, that phenomenal concepts can be deployed
without instantiating the properties to which they refer does not originate in Shea, 2014. Papineau (2006)
discusses this objection and attributes it to Tim Crane and Scott Sturgeon. Block 2006 attributes the same
objection to Kirk Ludwig.
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concept – let alone an entire class of concepts – must always be accompanied by specific
mental imagery.16
We do not challenge either of Shea’s central claims. Does this mean that we agree
that the PCS cannot work? No. There are two weaknesses in Shea’s argument. The first
weakness is that, contrary to Shea’s formulation of the PCS, it does not require the existence
of a general phenomenological difference between physical and phenomenal concepts. All
that is needed is a specific phenomenological difference that emerges in the context of the
judgment of contingency. After all, the relevant explanandum of DIP is this judgment and
not the general character of phenomenal concepts. The important question, then, is whether
the exercise of the relevant concepts in the context of the contemplation of contingency
leads to a significant phenomenological difference or not.17 Significantly, this contemplation
is likely to involve a considerable amount of conscious reasoning. Thus, even if we accept
that the employment of phenomenal concepts does not necessarily give rise to an associated
introspective phenomenology, the employment of phenomenal concepts in the context of
thinking about mind-brain identity statement will very likely yield an introspective
phenomenology. The second weakness is that he assumes that the purported phenomenal
difference is limited to the mere absence/presence of perception-like phenomenal
properties. However, there may be alternative ways of making the relevant distinction. For
instance, a quantitative or qualitative distinction defined over phenomenal properties may be
possible. Below, we outline and defend such a distinction.

For additional reasons against the contention that the exercise of phenomenal concepts
necessarily involves conscious awareness of the experience of their referents, see McDonald, 2004; Ball,
2009; and Tye, 2009.
17
A close examination of the Loar and Papineau quotes provided above as examples of DIP
reveals that both restrict their claims to circumscribed applications of the relevant concepts. Loar
explicitly limits his claims to the context of ‘philosophical ruminations’ and Papineau limits his claims to
the context of thinking ‘imaginatively.’
16
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To recap, evidence of conceptual embodiment appears to throw into question the
notion that there is a general phenomenological distinction between physical and
phenomenal concepts. If such a distinction is unsustainable, then standard attempts to
explain the appearance of contingency in mind-brain identity statements using DIP will not
work. However, the situation is not as hopeless as it may seem at first. The PCS can be
rescued by providing an account that identifies an introspective phenomenal difference that
emerges in the context of contingency judgments and involves more than the mere presence
of experiential properties.

5. DIP Reformulated

If embodied theories of cognition are even partially correct, then the neural resources
generally used for perception, action, and emotion can be recruited when we entertain
thoughts about the world around us. As noted above, such embodiment would exclude any
distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts that relies on the supposed absence
of phenomenological properties during the employment of physical concepts. The question
at hand is whether or not it is possible to draw a more sophisticated distinction between the
introspective phenomenology that is associated with the employment of the two types of
concepts – at least within the specific context of the sort of philosophical deliberation
involved in generating contingency judgments. We think that such a distinction can be
drawn.
A core idea of an embodied approach to cognition is that the employment of
concepts typically involves the simultaneous engagement of multiple sensorimotor and
affective neural systems. In other words, embodied cognition is committed to the de facto
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multimodality of our concepts. The following passage expresses a fairly standard embodied
view of conceptual structure:

A concept is an aggregated memory of aspects of experience that have repeatedly
received attention in the past, and incorporates perceptual, motor, affective,
introspective, social, linguistic and other information. For instance a concept of dog
could potentially include a host of perceptual-motor information, possibly including
visual information of the color and shape of a dog, tactile information regarding the
feel of a dog’s coat, olfactory information of the smell of a dog, auditory information
of a dog’s bark, motor information about patting a dog, social information about the
status of dog’s in human households, along with positive or negative affective
valence depending one’s experience with dogs in the past. Any time the word ‘dog’ is
encountered, a subset of these aspects will be retrieved to suit the task at hand.
(Lynott & Connell, 2010, p. 2)

From a general embodied perspective, the employment of a concept in a particular situation
involves bringing experientially derived information that is stored offline to bear on a
current, online cognitive task. What separates this approach from the traditional one (where
online processing is handled by a functionally independent amodal symbol system) is the
claim that the representations employed in our concepts are fundamentally grounded in our
modality-specific interactions with the environment we inhabit.18 Online cognitive processing
Admittedly, all of the information outlined above could be encoded in an amodal
representational system. This means that we cannot categorically rule out a traditional symbolic account
(Machery, 2007). We believe, though, that the brain imaging and neuropsychological evidence outlined
above favors the view that much of this information is encoded in representations that are indigenous to
specific sensorimotor and affective neural systems.
18
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involves the selective engagement of experiential states and which representations are
employed at any given moment will depend in large part on the situated context and the
relevant task. Thinking about dogs, for instance, can involve visual representations, olfactory
representations, auditory representations, and even touch representations. On account of the
different types of representations involved with the concept DOG, the concept DOG is said to
be multimodal. Indeed, most of our concepts are multimodal in precisely this sense: not only
do they encode a rich array of experientially derived information (information that was
derived from more than one sense modality), but also their employment involves the
simultaneous and selective engagement of multiple sensorimotor and affective neural
systems.19 Physical concepts are particularly likely to be multimodal in their realization. After
all, the presupposition is that they refer to external objects and events, which can be
experienced in multiple ways. In fact, concepts that refer to external objects and events have
to be multimodal. By their very nature, the referents of those concepts are ones that permit
our multimodal interaction with them.
It is important to recognize that a commitment to conceptual grounding does not
require a commitment to the universally quantified claim that all realizations of our concepts
are multimodal. Nothing in the theory excludes unimodal realizations. Indeed, even though
concepts are generally multimodal, phenomenal concepts are likely to be an exception to this
generalization. By definition, these concepts are about singular experiences such as seeing
red and feeling pain. These experiences are in an important sense unimodal. In other words,
unlike concepts that refer to external objects or events, which can be experienced in multiple
Within the embodied cognition literature, there is an active debate concerning the status of
abstract concepts such as JUSTICE, ODD NUMBER, and ELECTRON. Some contend that these are fully
embodied (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Prinz, 2002; Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, & Barsalou, 2013)
and others suggest that they may require multiple types of representations (Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Dove,
2009; Louwerse, 2011). Both of these responses are compatible with our embodied version of DIP, which
focuses on phenomenological flexibility.
19
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ways, there is typically only one way to experience the referents of phenomenal concepts.
The phenomenal concept

RED SENSATION,

for example, engages the visual system. Putting

aside cases of synesthesia (which we discuss below in the objections and replies section), we
neither touch, nor hear, nor smell, nor feel our red sensations. Unlike physical concepts,
phenomenal concepts encode modality specific information, and, crucially, their employment
activates modality specific neural systems.
One challenge faced by our approach is the existence of an ongoing controversy
concerning how to properly individuate sensory modalities. Some philosophers defend a
sparse, moderate view of the senses that lines up roughly with our folk psychological
preconceptions and others defend more fine-grained view that identifies a greater number of
individual senses. In part, this debate is driven by the need to develop a neuroscientifically
tractable conception that can be applied comparatively to non-human sensory systems
(Keely, 2002). It is also driven by a recognition that the various means by which scientists
and philosophers attempt to individuate sensory modalities may not converge on a single
solution to this problem (Macpherson, 2011). Our intention is to appeal to a notion of
sensory modality that is tied to unified perceptual experiences while recognizing that other
ways of individuating the senses may be useful and give different results. This potential
mismatch has seemed problematic in two types of cases: instances where there are crossmodal illusions created by the influence of one modality on another (O’Callaghan, 2008) and
instances where a unified experience seems to be the result of coordinated operations in
multiple senses (Fulkerson, 2011). A good example of the latter is the experience of flavor
when eating food (Fulkerson, 2014). This experience appears to depend on aroma, taste,
texture, and even temperature; thus, it can be meaningfully described as multisensory. While
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the existence of cross-modal illusions and multisensory experiences poses important
challenges for theories of the senses, our approach can handle both of these cases.
In developing the distinction between multimodal and unimodal concepts, what is
crucial for our purposes is the fact that physical concepts display a kind of flexibility that
phenomenal concepts lack. Thinking with physical concepts is flexible insofar as we can
think of the referents of those concepts using a number of modally distinct representations.
Furthermore, and rather importantly, no particular modality seems to enjoy an inherent
privilege over the others: that is, there are a number of (modally) different ways of thinking
about the referents of physical concepts. Such flexibility however seems to be absent in the
case of phenomenal concepts for they do not permit us to think of their referents in modally
distinct ways. We still have to think of the referents of phenomenal concepts in a particular
way. And that is the case, even if some experiences are multisensory. In the end, we are
using the term ‘unimodal’ as a shorthand for a kind of experiential specificity – one that can
be associated either with phenomenologically unified experiences in one sensory modality (as
in the case of seeing red or hearing middle C) or with phenomenologically unified
‘multisensory’ experiences (as in the case of flavors).
Ultimately, what we want to suggest is that it is possible to offer an embodied
version of DIP. Recall the fundamental idea behind DIP: ‘When we then bring phenomenal
and physical-theoretical concepts together in our philosophical ruminations, those cognitive
states are phenomenologically so different that the illusion may be created that their
references must be different’ (Loar, 1997, 302). Originally, Loar and others thought that the
cognitive states involving phenomenal concepts were phenomenologically different from
those involving physical concepts insofar as only the former involved a rich introspective
phenomenology. As we have seen, evidence from cognitive science suggests that
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phenomenological properties may also be involved in the employment of physical concepts
as well. However, this does not mean that there is not a significant phenomenological
difference between the cognitive states associated with the employment of the two types of
concepts. The difference lies in the fact that phenomenal concepts are phenomenologically
circumscribed whereas physical concepts are phenomenologically open and flexible.
When we carefully consider a conscious experience, say, the experience of seeing red,
we think of it unimodally.20 However, when we think of neural stimulation, we think of it
multimodally. The employment of a physical concept has a multimodal complexity that is
lacking from the employment of a phenomenal concept. The appearance of contingency in
mind-brain identity statements appears then to be a straightforward consequence of the
phenomenological difference involved in the employment of the two types of concepts. The
idea here is simple: we have come to associate multimodality with physical objects and
events. When this multimodality is absent however from our employment of phenomenal
concepts, it is natural for us to think that the referents of phenomenal concepts cannot be
physical objects and events. Consequently, it is natural for us to think that phenomenal and
physical concepts do not co-refer.
Our account builds upon a series of previous attempts to offer an explanation for
the persistency of the appearance of contingency in mind-brain identity statements by
utilizing features of the concepts involved in those statements. Although our account is
consistent with the overall approach of such attempts, what we offer here differs markedly
from such accounts. First, we do not insist that the employment of physical concepts fails to
Even if our natural tendency is to think of the experience of seeing red in a multimodal fashion
(including, perhaps, an affective dimension), the particular task of judging contingency requires filtering
out these factors just as thinking about the shape of a pug requires filtering out texture, color, smell, and
sound. In other words, this selectivity is entirely consistent with an embodied approach to concepts. For a
further discussion of these issues see our discussion of objections and replies below.
20
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have an associated phenomenology. In fact, we have shown that such a contention runs in
the face of a robust and diverse body of evidence from the cognitive sciences. Second, we
hold that even though it is possible for the employment of both types of concepts to have an
associated phenomenology insofar as the employment of both activates sensorimotor neural
mechanisms, there is still an important difference in their associated phenomenology. On
account of this difference, it is tempting to think that the two types of concepts do not corefer. Finally, previous attempts of accounting for the persistence of the appearance of
contingency have excessively focused on the nature of phenomenal concepts. As a
consequence, they failed to take sufficient notice of the multimodal representations that are
associated with the deployment of physical concept. Such an oversight, we contend, misled
theorists to think that only phenomenal concepts have an associated introspective
phenomenology. Once we allow that physical concepts also have an associated introspective
phenomenology, another way of accounting for the appearance of contingency makes itself
evident. One can account for the appearance of contingency by noting the contrast between
the multimodal character of physical concepts and the unimodal character of phenomenal
concepts.

6. Objections and Replies

We anticipate four main objections to the account of the appearance of contingency that we
have offered. In this section, we present these objections and offer rejoinders.

Objection 1. The unimodal-multimodal difference does nothing to show that
phenomenal concepts and physical concepts co-refer.
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Reply. Our account is not supposed to demonstrate that phenomenal concepts refer to
physical properties: the aim of the paper is neither to provide a positive argument for the
veracity of physicalism nor to respond to conceivability arguments against physicalism. What
the offered account aims to provide is simply an explanation of a purely psychological
phenomenon, one that has been thought to have important metaphysical ramifications. All
that we are offering, in other words, is a plausible and empirically-informed explanation of
the observation that mind-brain identity statements appear to us to be contingent. For
present purposes, a demonstration of the necessary status of such statements is neither given
nor needed. If phenomenal concepts and physical concepts do in fact co-refer, as
physicalism requires that they do, then there must be a psychological story to be told as to
why the two appear not to co-refer. This essay is telling precisely that story. And although
such a story, at least by itself, does not suffice to defend physicalism, it is still a necessary
part of a broader account that could rescue physicalism from epistemic arguments.

Objection 2. The unimodal-multimodal difference does not account for the
appearance of contingency.

Reply. The objection aims to demonstrate that merely noting a contrast between the
multimodal character of physical concepts and the unimodal character of phenomenal
concepts does not amount to an explanation of the observation that mind-brain identity
statements appear to be contingent. The objection thus fits with a general criticism of the
PCS, which claims that the presence of a phenomenological distinction fails to adequately
explain the appearance of contingency (Doggett & Stoljar, 2010). Before responding to this
29

objection it is important to clarify what it means to provide such an explanation. As
mentioned above, explaining the appearance of contingency is not tantamount to showing
something about the metaphysical status of mind-brain identity statements. To explain the
appearance of contingency is to provide a purely psychological account that makes it plausible
that one will think – when one entertains a mind-brain identity statement and considers its
modal status – that the statement is contingent. But we have precisely offered such an
account. When one thinks about the modal status of a mind-brain identity statement, one is
employing, at the same time, both phenomenal concepts and physical concepts. The joint
employment of these concepts leads to an introspectively ‘perceived’ or ‘noticed’ contrast
between the characters of the two types of concepts. On account of this contrast, one finds
it natural to conclude that the two types of concepts do not co-refer.
It is crucial to note that our explanation does not amount simply to the claim that the
appearance of contingency is the result of the employment of two types of concepts. We
also offer a reason why such a joint employment is responsible for the appearance of
contingency. A consequence of the multimodality of physical concepts is that no particular
modality is essential to their realization. Indeed, a basic assumption among embodied
theories of concepts is that sensorimotor systems are selectively engaged on any given
occasion due to the context and the task involved. For instance, sound, shape, and
movement but not color and touch might be engaged when trying to categorize something
running across the yard. Phenomenal concepts do not enjoy this sensorimotor flexibility,
particularly within the context of philosophical rumination. Indeed, they exhibit
sensorimotor rigidity. We suggest then that the associated phenomenological difference –
the ability to conceptualize physical categories in a flexible manner and the inability to
conceptualize phenomenal concepts this way – gives rise to the appearance of contingency.
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It is this phenomenological difference that leads one to conclude that the two types of
concept do not co-refer. If so, then the appearance of contingency arises from the specific
character of phenomenal and physical concepts and not from the mere act of combining
distinct types of concepts (cf. Doggert & Stoljar, 2010).
Lastly, the offered explanation of the appearance of contingency is, at least in broad
strokes, in agreement with the explanation offered by DIP. Thus, one cannot think that DIP
provides a plausible explanation of the appearance of contingency and yet deny that our
account does the same. In other words, proponents of the PCS who wish to account for the
appearance of contingency in mind-brain identity statements should give up the standard
formulation of DIP and accept instead our embodied variant of it. If one is antecedently
committed to physicalism, then it is very tempting to try to deal with Kripke’s objection by
providing a psychological explanation of the appearance of contingency. Our account not
only offers a psychological – and thus physicalistically acceptable – explanation of Kripke’s
observation, it also offers one that is in line with recent work on embodied cognition.

Objection 3. Phenomenal concepts are not unimodal.

Our explanation of the appearance of the contingency is premised on the claim that
phenomenal concepts are unimodal. But are they? There are different ways in which one can
try to motivate the claim that phenomenal concepts are not unimodal. Before we consider
some of those ways, it is important to clarify two views of phenomenal concepts, both of
which are congenial to our purposes. The first view treats phenomenal concepts as essentially
unimodal concepts. Accordingly, the employment of a phenomenal concept is such that
necessarily includes only representations that are of the same sensory modality to that of the
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referent of the concept. For example, the employment of the phenomenal concept
SENSATION

RED

is such that necessarily invokes (consciously or unconsciously) a set of visual

representations that are related to the experience of seeing red. The second view of
phenomenal concepts does not treat phenomenal as essentially unimodal. Rather, it allows
that phenomenal concepts, just like the majority of our concepts, are multimodal. Still, the
view insists that (a) the nature of the representations invoked by the employment of
phenomenal concepts is context-specific and (b) within the context of consciously thinking
about the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness, the employment of a phenomenal concept
becomes unimodal. For instance, when thinking about the modal status of the sentence ‘Red
sensation is identical to a set of neural processes,’ one employs the phenomenal concept RED
SENSATION

in a unimodal way. To employ the concept in this context is to filter out

everything that is not the sensation of seeing red. This ‘filtering out’ process is one that we
often and unconsciously do. For instance, thinking about dogs in contexts that we are
interested in their smell, we employ the concept

DOG

in a way that filters out many of our

associated representations of that concept that are not olfactory representations. Thus, this
second view of phenomenal concepts holds that even if phenomenal concepts are not
essentially unimodal, they are contingently unimodal: in the context of conscious
contemplation regarding the modal status of mind-brain identity statements, phenomenal
concepts act as filters that allow us to focus on specific qualitative features of our
experiences.
For the purposes of this paper, we wish to remain neutral on whether phenomenal
concepts are essentially or only contingently unimodal. Although we are inclined to accept
the view that phenomenal concepts are only contingently unimodal, there is no need to
adjudicate this difficult issue here. Recall that the relevant explanandum of our account is the
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psychological observation that mind-brain statements appear contingent when we consciously
deliberate about their modal status. In the specific context of thinking about the modal status of
mind-brain statements, both views of phenomenal concepts predict that their employment
will be unimodal.
In what follows, we consider reasons against the claim that phenomenal concepts are
unimodal. We show that even if those reasons can be taken to suggest that phenomenal
concepts are not essentially multimodal, they do nothing to undermine the weaker claim that
they are contingently unimodal.

Objection 3.1. The case of synesthesia. ‘Synesthesia’ refers to the statistically rare capacity
to experience the merge of different sense modalities. Synesthetes, for instance, feel voices,
see music, smell colors, and even taste shapes. Consider the following reports of such
experiences (all quoted from Cytowic, 2002, p. 1):

What first strikes me is the color of someone’s voice. [V––] has a crumbly, yellow
voice, like a flame with protruding fibers. Sometimes I get so interested in the voice,
I can’t understand what’s being said.

Spearmint tastes like cool, glass columns. Lemon is a pointed shape, pressed into my
face and hands. It’s like laying my hands on a bed of nails.

I enjoy music that has wavy metallic lines, like oscilloscope tracings. My favorite
music has movement that extends beyond my peripheral vision. I really like music
that makes the lines go up.
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Phenomenal concepts, we claimed above, are unimodal insofar as their employment (at least
in the context of thinking about mind-brain identity statements) gives rise to the activation
of neural mechanisms that match the sensory modality of the manner in which we come to
experience their referents.21 The case of synesthesia, one might suggest, speaks against the
claim that the referents of phenomenal concepts are experienced only via one sense
modality. If a synesthete both hears and sees sounds, then not only the information encoded
by the phenomenal concept of a specific sound will be multimodal but also the employment
of that concept will very likely activate neural mechanisms related to distinct sense
modalities.

Reply. The problem that synesthesia raises for our account is more apparent than real.
Granted, synesthetes have modally-fused experiences that appear to involve multiple
perceptual systems. Functional neuroimaging studies have observed activation of color
processing areas of the visual cortex with the auditory presentation of spoken number words
(Nunn et al., 2002) and the visual presentation of achromatic number graphemes (Hubbard,
Arman, Ramachandran, & Boynton, 2005). Other studies detect activation of somatosensory
areas with synesthetic auditory-tactile experiences (e.g. Beauchamp & Ro, 2008). In keeping
with an embodied and grounded perspective, there is also behavioral and neural evidence

In light of our previous discussion regarding the vexing issue of individuating the senses, it is
worth emphasizing that our use of the term ‘unimodal’ permits the possibility that certain
phenomenologically unified experiences are inherently multisensory. Therefore, even if some phenomenal
concepts turn out to be multisensory (e.g., the ones that we use to introspectively examine the
phenomenal character of flavors), they are still meaningfully unimodal insofar as their employment
involves an experiential specificity and inflexibility that is absent from paradigmatic multimodal concepts
such as physical concepts. Synesthesia seems to be a more problematic kind of multisensory experience
than these examples because of its phenomenological complexity.
21
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that synesthetic experiences can be generated by some synesthetes performing mental
imagery tasks (Aleman, Rutten, Sitskoorn, Dautzenberg, & Ramsey, 2001; Grossenbach &
Lovelace, 2001; Spiller & Jansari, 2008). Yet, conceding modally-fused experiences does
nothing to show that they are incapable of isolating the two modally distinct aspects of their
experiences. Indeed, synesthetes’s own descriptions of their experiences strongly suggest that
they are able to discern these modally distinct features of their experiences. They hear music
and at the same time they see colors or shapes. This point holds even though there are some
individual differences with respect to how synesthetes describe their phenomenological
experience (Ward & Mattingly, 2006). Regardless of how intimately connected or fused the
two modally distinct aspects of their experiences are, synesthetes still recognize them as
being modally distinct. As long as synesthetes can isolate aspects of their experience as
properly belonging to their respective sense modalities, then it is enough to show that
phenomenal concepts can be (at least contingently) unimodal. One employs a phenomenal
concept when one thinks about one’s experiences. Thus, when synesthetes think about one
modal aspect of their experiences, then they think of that aspect by employing a unimodal
phenomenal concept. 22

Objection 3.2. Phenomenal concepts are not perspectival. If phenomenal concepts are
unimodal, then it is seems plausible to suggest that phenomenal concepts are perspectival (Tye,
1995, chapter 6). That is, phenomenal concepts are perspectival insofar as one can come to
possess a phenomenal concept only if one experiences that to which the concept refers. For
The case of synesthesia does not differ radically, one might even suggest, from the manner in
which we experience our environment. Our experiences are modally complex: they typically involve the
objects of more than one sense modality. Still, we are capable, at least most of the time, of isolating and
focusing on the contributions of each modality.
22
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instance, one is said to be in possession of the phenomenal concept RED SENSATION, only if
one has had a red experience. Although the claim that phenomenal concepts are perspectival
is widely accepted (see, e.g., Papineau, 2007; Block 2006) and has been utilized in providing a
response to Jackson’s knowledge argument (Loar, 1997; Tye, 2003), recently such a claim has
been met with resistance (see, e.g., Stoljar, 2000, 41 n.15; McDonald, 2004; Ball 2009; Tye
2009). If it turns out that phenomenal concepts are not perspectival, then the claim that
phenomenal concepts are unimodal is threatened.

Reply. It is not our aim to explicate the possession conditions of phenomenal concepts.
Nor do we wish to critically assess arguments in support of the claim that phenomenal
concepts are not perspectival (see instead Alter, 2013; Elpidorou, 2012 and forthcoming;
Veillet, 2012). Instead, we shall grant that phenomenal concepts are not perspectival.
Consequently, we accept that one can come to possess them even if one did not have the
relevant experience. Still, accepting that phenomenal concepts are not perspectival only
militates against the claim that phenomenal concepts are essentially unimodal. The
concession that phenomenal concepts are not perspectival does nothing to undermine that
phenomenal concepts are not contingently unimodal. And this weaker claim is all that we need.
In fact, we predict that a subject who possesses the phenomenal concept
SENSATION

RED

but who has never had the experience of seeing red, will not find the statement

‘Red sensation is brain activation’ contingent, at least not in the same manner that we do.
Such a prediction is consistent with our account. The joint employment of phenomenal and
physical concepts by the experienced-deprived subject will not yield an appearance of
contingency because there is no contrast between multimodal and unimodal concepts. The
subject’s relevant concepts would be both multimodal.
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Objection 4. The unimodal-multimodal difference accounts for too much. One could
argue that the provided account of the appearance of contingency ought to be rejected for it
predicts that certain statement should appear to be contingent, even though those statements
do not appear to be so (see Yablo, 2009; cf. Levin, 2007b). Consider the following two
statements:

(1)

Rocks feel pain.

(2)

Pain Φ is neural activity Ψ.

One could hold that (1), contrary to (2), does not appear to be contingent. Statement (1) is
necessarily false and thinking about (1) does not yield an appearance of contingency. But the
lack of the appearance of contingency when we are thinking of (1) poses a problem for our
position. Or so one could suggest. (1), just like (2), involves the joint employment of
phenomenal and physical concepts. But if we are right to insist that the reason why (2)
appears to be contingent is because thinking about (2) involves the joint employment of
unimodal and multimodal concepts, then (1) should also appear to be contingent. It also
involves the employment of unimodal and multimodal concepts. Yet (1) does not appear to
be contingent. Therefore, our account of explaining the appearance of contingency cannot
be correct.

Reply. We have two responses to offer to the aforementioned objection. First, it is rather
unclear whether the claim that (1) does not appear to be contingent should be accepted as a
datum. Couldn’t we imagine possible worlds in which there are breathing, moving, and
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indeed sentient rocks? And don’t such imaginary worlds contribute to an appearance of
contingency? After all, in the 1970’s all it took to create ‘pet rocks’ were pairs of glued on
eyes.23 Certainly, part of the joke was the impossibility of rock consciousness. But another
part was the ease with which we are able to imbue inanimate things with sentience. Indeed,
the list of seemingly inanimate things to which humans have attached sentience is quite
diverse and extensive. Granted, what we imagine when we think of moving, breathing, and
sentient rocks might be something that is rather confused. Perhaps our confusion is similar
to the one that occurs when we imagine impossible objects such as purple gold or floating iron
bars. Still, in both cases, there is at least a prima facie appearance of contingency.
Second, even if we accept that (1) does not appear to be contingent, this concession
still fails to raise serious problems for our position. What we have offered in trying to
account for the appearance of contingency in mind-brain identity statements is not a list of
necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of contingency. The fact that the
appearance of contingency in (2) is due to the contrast between multimodal and unimodal
concepts does not mean that such a contrast suffices for the appearance of contingency. In
fact, our concept

ROCKS

involves information that runs counter to the possibility of

ascribing certain sensations to the referent of that concept (Levin, 2007b). Thus, the joint
employment of multimodal and unimodal concepts will not necessarily give rise to an
appearance of contingency. What it is also needed is that the information encoded in one
concept is congruent with the information encoded in the other. In the case of the
and

PAIN,

ROCKS

however, this condition is not met. Our ordinary understanding of rocks is such

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pet_Rock. For advice on how to care for a pet rock see
http://www.wikihow.com/Care-for-Your-Pet-Rock.
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that precludes the attribution of sensation to them. It is due to that incongruity between the
information encoded in the two concepts that the appearance of contingency is suppressed.
Our position also offers a response to a related objection to the PCS found in Stoljar
(2005) and (2006, p. 193f.). Consider the following statement:

(3) If x is a number, then x is not a red sensation.

Stoljar argues that examples such as (3) are problematic for the PCS for the following two
reasons. First, the PCS predicts that (3) should appear to be contingent but no such
appearance is present. Second, if (3) is a priori, then there are conceptual connections
between phenomenal concepts and other concepts. But if such conceptual connections exist,
then don’t they threaten the presumed a posteriori status of mind-brain statements and
conditionals?
Given what came before, our response to Stoljar’s claims ought to be clear. First,
even if some versions of the PCS strategy do predict that (3) should appear to be contingent,
our account makes no such prediction. We are not committed to the claim that every
sentence that has both unimodal and multimodal concepts is such that will give rise to an
appearance of contingency. The appearance of contingency, we hold, does not only depend
on the presence of a unimodal-multimodal contrast but also on the information encoded in
the concepts used in a sentence. In the case of (3), just like that of (1), the information
encoded in NUMBER is such that does not permit the possibility of treating numbers as being
identical to sensations. Indeed, whatever the ontological status of numbers may be, it is clear
to anyone who is in possession of the concepts NUMBER and RED SENSATION that numbers
are not sensations. Second, the PCS does not hold that phenomenal concepts bear no
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conceptual ties whatsoever to other types of concepts. In fact, it is due to the presence of such
ties between NUMBER and RED SENSATION that (3) both is a priori and fails to give rise to an
appearance of contingency. What is crucial for the PCS is the claim that phenomenal
concepts are conceptually isolated from physical or functional concepts insofar as there are
no sufficient conditions for being a phenomenal state that can be specified a priori in physical
or functional terms (see also Diaz-Leon, 2008 and Balog, 2009). The fact that (3) is a priori
does nothing to undermine the PCS’s contention that such sufficient conditions cannot be
given a priori.

7. Conclusion

In this essay, we have argued for two conclusions. First, the way in which proponents of the
PCS have typically explained the appearance of contingency in mind-brain identity
statements does not withstand empirical scrutiny. A large body of evidence suggesting that
our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems undermines the
contention that only the exercise of phenomenal concepts brings about an introspective
phenomenology. As such, DIP fails to provide an adequate model for the appearance of
contingency. Second, even if the standard formulation of DIP has to be rejected, we have
shown that one can offer a novel version of DIP that is thoroughly in keeping with
embodied cognition and which successfully succeeds in explaining the appearance of
contingency in mind-brain identity statements. Phenomenal concepts, at least when deployed
within the context of philosophical ruminations regarding the mind-body problem, are
unimodal. On account of this unimodality, the deployment of phenomenal concepts exhibits
both a type of simplicity and sensorimotor rigidity. That is to say, unlike physical concepts,
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the deployment of a phenomenal concept includes only representations of a specific sense
modality and, as a result, one can conceptualize the referents of phenomenal concepts in
only one (modally specific) manner. From an introspective perspective, the deployment of
physical concepts appears very different from that of phenomenal concepts. It is on account
of such a difference that one is mislead to conclude that the two types of concept do not corefer.
Our embodied version of DIP is not one that has been previously advanced in the
literature; it does not demand the involvement of two different faculties or two types of
imagination (Nagel, 1974; Hill & McLaughlin, 1999); it does not commit us to theses
regarding the possession and acquisition conditions of phenomenal concepts; and, most
importantly, it does not rest merely on intuitive grounds. It is time, we believe, that
participants in debates in the metaphysics and epistemology of modality pay close attention
to how the human mind actually functions when they consider the potential contributions of
psychological factors to philosophical problems. Even if what we have offered is not the last
word on the topic, it is at least an empirically-informed beginning.
Guy Dove
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